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Abstract 
Analysts of air travel markets, which include antitrust authorities, are interested in understanding 
the extent to which the presence of intermediate stop(s) products influences the pricing of 
nonstop products.  This paper uses a structural econometric model to investigate the potential 
pricing interdependence between these two product types in domestic air travel markets.  
Counterfactual experiments using the estimated model suggest that in many (but far from a 
majority) markets the current prices of nonstop products are at least 5% lower than they would 
otherwise be owing to the presence of intermediate-stop(s) products. 
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1. Introduction 
Analysts of air travel markets are interested in understanding the extent to which the 
presence of intermediate stop(s) products influences the pricing of nonstop products.  Among the 
analysts interested in this issue is the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), which published a 
document stating the following: 1
 
  
“...there are many city pairs that are served by some carriers on a nonstop basis and others on a 
connecting basis, which poses the following question: is a passenger having the ability to take a 
nonstop flight likely to regard connecting service as a reasonable alternative, such that he or she 
would switch from nonstop service offered by one carrier to connecting service offered by 
another carrier if the first carrier raised its fare?” 
 
A typical air travel origin-destination market contains a menu of nonstop and 
intermediate-stop(s) products from which potential consumers choose.  If consumers are willing 
to substitute between these two differentiated product types in response to relative changes in 
price, then the presence of intermediate-stop(s) products can have significant impact on the 
pricing of nonstop products.  This paper intends to shed light on the potential pricing 
interdependence between these two product types in air travel markets.  To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no formal empirical analysis of this issue in the literature, even though some 
researchers have separately analyzed competition between nonstop products from competition 
between intermediate-stop(s) products [e.g. see Brueckner et al. (2013)]. 
Standard oligopoly theory pricing models suggest that there are primarily two channels 
through which intermediate-stop(s) products may influence the pricing of nonstop products: (1) a 
demand-elasticity-driven channel; and (2) a marginal cost channel.  The demand-elasticity-
driven channel recognizes that the optimal markup an airline charges on a given product depends 
on the product's own-price elasticity as well as the product's cross-price elasticity with substitute 
products the airline also offers in the market.  The marginal cost channel recognizes that an 
airline's marginal cost of offering a given product in a market may depend on the other products 
that are also offered in the market.  We first conduct a separate and thorough investigation of the 
own-price and cross-price demand elasticities between nonstop and intermediate-stop(s) 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Justice (2000), “Statement of John M. Nannes, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust 
division, Before the Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, Concerning 
Antitrust analysis of Airline Mergers.”  http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/4955.htm.  
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products, which motivates and facilitates a separate analysis of the demand-elasticity-driven 
channel.  A subsequent investigation of the joint impact of the demand-elasticity-driven and 
marginal cost channels is then conducted.     
In studying air travel demand, Berry and Jia (2010) provide evidence suggesting that in 
recent time consumers have an increasingly strong preference for nonstop products compared to 
intermediate-stop(s) products.  Gillen et al. (2003) conduct a report of air travel demand 
elasticities for Canada.  They suggest that the demand for air travel should be distinguished by 
types of consumers (leisure vs. business travelers), length of haul (short-haul vs. long-haul 
distance), and types of markets (domestic vs. international destinations).  So in addition to a 
general investigation of the pricing interdependence between these product types, it might be 
useful to see if the result of the investigation depends on length of market haul or types of 
consumers.  The following quote from a DOJ published document further motivates breaking 
down the analysis by consumer types: 2
 
 
 “...Chances are that passengers traveling for leisure -- on vacation perhaps -- are more likely to 
consider switching; their demand is said to be more elastic. However, passengers making 
business trips are significantly less likely to regard connecting service as a reasonable 
alternative...” 
   
The challenge we face in breaking down the analysis by consumer type is that publicly 
available data, like the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) which we use, do not 
provide information about consumers’ purpose of travel (e.g. business versus leisure).  As such, 
in the spirit of recent literature on differentiated products demand, we use a structural 
econometric model to capture consumers' heterogeneity in tastes. 3
Our econometric estimates suggest that consumers’ ideal air travel product is a cheap 
nonstop flight between their origin and destination.  When we decompose consumers' choice 
behavior according to leisure versus business travelers, the result suggests that these two types of 
  Modeling consumers' 
heterogeneity is important for more accurate estimation of demand elasticities, corresponding 
product markups, and implied marginal costs.    
                                                 
2 U.S. Department of Justice (2000), “Statement of John M. Nannes, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust 
division, Before the Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, Concerning 
Antitrust analysis of Airline Mergers.”  http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/4955.htm.  
3 We follow Berry and Jia (2010) approach, but for more flexible consumer heterogeneity specifications see Nevo 
(2000) and Petrin (2002). 
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consumers view a product differently with respect to their marginal utilities of price.  Leisure 
travelers are much more price-sensitive compared to business travelers irrespective of whether 
the market is short-haul, mid-haul, or long-haul distance travel.     
The statistically significant cross-price elasticity of demand estimates suggest that, on 
average, consumers perceive intermediate-stop(s) products substitutable for nonstop products.  
Furthermore, when facing an increase in price of nonstop products, we find that leisure travelers 
are more willing than business travelers to switch to intermediate-stop(s) products, suggesting 
that leisure travelers are more willing to tolerate intermediate stops compared to business 
travelers.  
We then specify the supply-side of the model, which is based on the assumption that 
airlines set prices of their differentiated air travel products according to a Nash equilibrium.  We 
use the supply-side of the model to conduct counterfactual exercises to better understand the 
extent to which the presence of intermediate-stop(s) products influences the pricing of nonstop 
products.  These counterfactual exercises explicitly take into account the two channels through 
which intermediate-stop(s) products may influence the pricing of nonstop products.  The results 
suggest that if we focus solely on the demand-elasticity-driven part of optimal pricing, then we 
find that intermediate-stop(s) products typically has a less than 5% impact, and in most cases less 
than 1%, on the price of nonstop products.  However, assuming that the presence of 
intermediate-stop(s) products causes the marginal costs of nonstop products to be uniformly 
lower (about 5%) than they would otherwise be, as well as accounting for the demand-elasticity-
driven part of optimal pricing, results suggest that in many (but far from a majority) markets the 
current prices of nonstop products are lower than they would otherwise be owing to the presence 
of intermediate-stop(s) products such that elimination of these intermediate-stop(s) products 
would substantially raise prices of nonstop products.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Important definitions used throughout the 
paper are collected in Section 2.  Section 3 describes the data used in estimation.  Sections 4 and 
5 outline the econometric model and the estimation technique respectively.  We discuss results in 
Section 6, and offer concluding remarks in Section 7.     
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2. Definitions    
We now define some key concepts that are used throughout the paper.  A market is 
directional air travel between origin and destination airports, independent of any intermediate 
stops.  Thus, a trip from Kansas City to Atlanta is considered a different market than a trip from 
Atlanta to Kansas City.  This direction-specific approach of defining air travel markets allows 
our model to better capture the impact that differences in demographic characteristics across 
origin cities may have on air travel demand.  For example, origin cities that differ in population 
density and proportion of business versus leisure travelers are likely to have different demands 
for air travel.   
A trip itinerary refers to a specific sequence of airport stops in traveling from the origin to 
destination airport.  An air travel product is defined as the combination of a trip itinerary and 
airline.  In a given market, airlines often compete with each other by offering a variety of 
products.  For example, varied products in the Atlanta to Kansas City market are: (1) a nonstop 
trip operated by American Airlines; (2) a nonstop trip operated by Delta Airlines; and (3) a trip 
that requires an intermediate stop in Chicago operated by American Airlines.  In other words, an 
air travel carrier can offer several distinct products in a given market, as in the example above in 
which American Airlines offers both a nonstop product along with a product that requires an 
intermediate stop in Chicago.   
For any given product, the responsibilities of a “ticketing” carrier are different from those 
of an “operating” carrier.  A ticketing carrier is an air travel carrier that markets and sells the 
flight ticket for a product to consumers, while an operating carrier is the one that actually 
transports the passengers.  For most products, typically labeled in the literature as pure online 
products, a single carrier is the ticketing and operating carrier, while for other products, some of 
which are referred to as codeshare products, the ticketing and operating carriers differ.4  In this 
research we treat the ticketing carrier as the “owner” of the product since this is the carrier that 
offers the product for sale to the consumer.5
 
  
 
                                                 
4 See Ito and Lee (2007), Gayle (2013, 2008, 2007a and 2007b) and Gayle and Brown (2014) for discussions of the 
various types of air travel products and their relative popularity in US domestic air travel markets.  
5 In relatively rare occasions products with intermediate stops may have different ticketing carriers for each trip 
segment, but we do not consider such products in our analysis.  The products considered in our analysis have a 
single ticketing carrier for all trip segments.  
5 
 
3. Data 
Data are obtained from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), published by 
the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  DB1B is a 10% random sample of airline tickets 
from reporting carriers in the U.S.  The database includes:  (i) identifying information for 
ticketing and operating carriers associated with each ticket; (ii) the ticket fare and the number of 
passengers that purchase each ticket; (iii) the origin and destination airports as well as the 
sequence of any intermediate airport stop(s) that each itinerary may use; (iv) total itinerary flight 
distance; and (v) the nonstop flight distance between the origin and destination airports.  The 
data do not contain any passenger-specific information such as:  (i) whether the passenger holds 
frequent-flyer membership with an airline; (ii) whether the purpose of the trip is for business or 
leisure; (iii) date of ticket purchase; (iv) how long in advance of travel date ticket was purchased; 
etc.  Data in our study are focused on U.S. domestic flights offered and operated by U.S. carriers 
in the 1st quarter of year 2010.  
Some data restrictions are imposed in our study.  Observations are dropped with missing 
market fares and market fares less than $50 due to the high probability that these may be data 
entry coding errors or discounted fares that may be related to passengers using accumulated 
frequent-flyer miles to offset the full cost of travel.  Only products between the 48 main land 
U.S. states are included.  In addition, flight itineraries with a change in the ticketing carrier or the 
operating carrier are eliminated.  In order for a product from the original database to remain in 
our sample we require that at least 5 passengers purchase it during the quarter.6
                                                 
6 Berry (1992), Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) among others use similar, and sometimes more stringent, quantity 
threshold to help eliminate idiosyncratic product offerings that are not part of the normal set of products offered in a 
market. 
  In addition, we 
drop the relatively few products that have 3 or more intermediate stops since in these instances 
the intermediate stops may themselves be destinations of importance for the passenger rather 
than a mere route to get the passenger to their final destination.  In other words, consumers that 
purchase products with 3 or more intermediate stops are unlikely to perceive products with 
fewer, or no, intermediate stop as substitutable with the chosen product since the final destination 
may not have been the only destination of importance for the passenger.  Given that a key part of 
our analysis is to investigate the extent to which nonstop products are substitutable with 
intermediate-stop(s) products, including products with 3 or more intermediate stops may unduly 
bias our results towards finding weak substitutability.  Last, to facilitate our main objective, an 
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origin-destination market remains in our sample only if it has both nonstop and intermediate-
stop(s) products.  
In order to collapse the data based on our definition of air travel product, we compute the 
mean price for each distinct itinerary-carrier combination.  Thus, a product’s “price” is the mean 
ticket fare for its unique itinerary-carrier combination.  Also, a “quantity” variable is created 
based on the sum of passengers that purchase the product.  This variable is used to construct 
observed product shares, which is defined as product “quantity” divided by the potential market 
size.  As in Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006) and Berry and Jia (2010), we measure potential 
market size using the geometric mean across origin city and destination city populations of the 
market.  The final dataset has sample size of 11,425 products spread across 773 origin-
destination markets. 
We then construct some product characteristics variables.  “Interstop” is a variable that 
counts the number of intermediate stops in each product.  A measure of product “Inconvenience” 
is created as the ratio of the total itinerary flight distance to the nonstop flight distance between 
origin and destination.  The minimum possible value of the Inconvenience variable is 1, 
indicating the least inconvenient itinerary distance in the market.  We also construct an airline 
“HUB_Origin” zero-one dummy variable that equals 1 only if the origin airport is a HUB for the 
ticketing carrier of the product.     
Following Berry and Jia (2010), in order to capture potential product characteristics that 
are unobservable to us due to the relatively high traffic congestion in Florida and Las Vegas, we 
create a “Tour” zero-one dummy variable that equals 1 if the airport is in Florida or Las Vegas.  
A “Slot_control” variable counts the number of slot-controlled airports on a product's itinerary, 
which captures possible travel inconveniences for passengers due to airport traffic congestion at 
slot-controlled airports. 7
We posit that air travel supply is a function of the following cost-shifting variables: 
Itinerary Distance (in thousand miles), Itinerary Distance Squared (denoted as Distance2), 
HUB_MC dummy, Slot_MC dummy, and operating carrier dummies.  “HUB_MC” is a zero-one 
  In the subsequent sections of the paper we posit that air travel demand 
is a function of the following variables: Price (in thousand dollars), Interstop, Inconvenience, 
HUB_Origin dummy, Tour dummy, Slot_control, and ticketing carrier fixed effects. 
                                                 
7  The slot-controlled airports are New Jersey Newark (EWR), New York Kennedy (JFK), New York LaGuardia 
(LGA), and Washington National (DCA). 
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dummy variable that equals 1 if the origin, intermediate stop(s), or destination airport is a HUB 
for the carrier.  “Slot_MC” is a zero-one dummy variable that equals 1 if the Slot_control 
variable is greater than zero.  Descriptive statistics of the sample data are reported in Table 1.   
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Price 
Mean ticket fare for each product, measured 
in thousand dollars 0.2151 0.0990 0.068 3.889 
Quantity Number of passengers for each product 214.83 642.44 5 9181 
Interstop 
  
Number of intermediate stops for each 
product 0.7488 0.4586 0 2 
Inconvenience 
 
A product’s cumulative itinerary distance 
flown from the origin to destination divided 
by the nonstop flight distance between the 
origin and destination  
1.1488 0.2246 1 2.875 
HUB_Origin 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the origin 
airport is a HUB for the ticketing carrier, 
otherwise variable takes the value 0 
0.1243 0.3299 0 1 
Tour 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the airport 
is in Florida or Las Vegas, otherwise 
variable takes the value 0 
0.1937 0.3952 0 1 
Slot_control 
Number of slot-controlled airports on a 
product’s itinerary 0.1477 0.3611 0 2 
Distance 
A product’s cumulative itinerary distance 
flown from the origin to destination, 
measured in thousand miles 
1.6620 0.6692 0.337 3.843 
HUB_MC 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if either the 
origin, the intermediate stop(s), or the 
destination airport is a HUB for the carrier 
0.4712 0.4992 0 1 
Slot_MC 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
Slot_control variable is greater than zero 0.1454 0.3525 0 1 
No. of observations/ 
No. of products 11425         
 
 
Overall, across the 773 markets in our sample, the average market fare is about $215.10.  
Figure 1 illustrates average market fare of nonstop products compared to intermediate-stop(s) 
products based on flight distance of markets. 8
                                                 
8 To arrive at the average market fare by product type reported in Figure 1, we first compute the median fare by 
product type in each market, then take the average of these median fares across markets within a given distance 
category.  
  A short-haul market is a market with nonstop 
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flying distance shorter than 500 miles.  The other two market distance categories are the mid-
haul market with nonstop flying distance between 500 miles and 1,500 miles, and the long-haul 
market with nonstop flying distance longer than 1,500 miles, according to definitions in Gillen et 
al. (2003). 
The average market fare is increasing in distance for both types of products.  A 
comparison of nonstop and intermediate-stop(s) products’ prices reveal that the pricing gap 
between the two product types varies depending on the length of the trip.  The average market 
fare of nonstop products is greater than that of intermediate-stop(s) products in mid-haul and 
long-haul markets.  However, the opposite occurs in short-haul markets.  The evidence in Figure 
1 perhaps suggests that competition between these differentiated products may depend on the 
market nonstop flight distance.  
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4. The Model   
4.1 Demand  
Following Berry and Jia (2010) and Berry, Carnal and Spiller (2006),9
The indirect utility consumer 𝑖, who is type 𝑡 ∈ {𝐿,𝐵}, obtain from purchasing product 𝑗 
in market 𝑚 is given by: 
 we use a random 
coefficients discrete choice approach, which allows us to estimate with aggregate market-level 
data while still being able to identify average choice behavior of different types of consumers.  
Assume air travel markets are populated with two types of consumers.  Type 1 consumers on 
average are relatively more price-sensitive and have a higher tolerance for less convenient travel 
itineraries compared to type 2 consumers.  Therefore, we may reasonably interpret type 1 
consumers to be leisure travelers (subsequently denoted by L) and type 2 consumers to be 
business travelers (subsequently denoted by B).  But this interpretation of the two consumer 
types is not “cast in stone”.   
 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑚 = 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝛽𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑝𝑗𝑚 + 𝜉𝑗𝑚 + 𝜎𝜁𝑖g𝑚 + (1 − 𝜎)𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑚 ,    (1) 
where 𝑥𝑗𝑚 is a vector of non-price observable product characteristics,
10
Some passengers may view the set of products offered by a given airline to be closer 
substitutes for each other compared to the substitutability of these products with products offered 
by other airlines, since a given airline’s set of products may share a common desirable 
characteristic.  A passenger may therefore choose to have frequent-flyer membership with a 
given airline, which serves to reinforce the passenger’s loyalty to the set of products offered by 
that airline.  Since we do not have passenger-specific information in the data, such as frequent-
 𝛽𝑡 is a vector of taste 
coefficients for consumers of type t associated with product characteristics in 𝑥𝑗𝑚 , 𝑝𝑗𝑚  is the 
product price, 𝛼𝑡 is the marginal utility for consumers of type t associated with a change in price, 
𝜉𝑗𝑚  captures components of product characteristics that are observed by consumers but 
unobserved to researchers, 𝜁𝑖g𝑚 is a random component of utility that is common to all products 
in group g, whereas the random term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑚 is specific to product j.  Note that g = 0,1,2, … ,𝐺 
index product groups within a market, and one outside alternative (g=0).  The outside alternative 
is the option not to purchase one of the air travel products considered in the model.   
                                                 
9 Also see Berry (1990). 
10 Based on our previous discussion in the data section, variables in 𝑥𝑗𝑚 includes: Interstop, Inconvenience, 
HUB_Origin dummy, Tour dummy, Slot_control, and ticketing carrier fixed effects. 
10 
 
flyer membership, one attempt to capture airline brand-loyal choice behavior of consumers is to 
group products by airline in the demand model.  This type of product grouping allows 
preferences to be correlated across products offered by a given airline.  Therefore, product 
groups that are indexed by g in equation (1) are based on airlines.                
 The parameter 𝜎, lying between 0 and 1, measures the correlation of the consumers’ 
utility across products belonging to the same group/airline.  As 𝜎 approaches 1 there is stronger 
correlation of consumers’ preferences across products that belong to the same airline.  On the 
other hand, there is no correlation of preferences if 𝜎 = 0 .  Consumer choice behavior is 
consistent with utility maximization when 𝜎 ∈ (0,1) and the product share function has the 
traditional nested logit form. 
Let 𝜆𝑡 be the percentage of type t consumers in the population, where 𝑡 ∈ {𝐿,𝐵}.  The 
overall market share of product j in market m is:  
     𝑠𝑗𝑚(𝐱,𝐩, 𝝃,𝜃) = 𝜆𝐿 × 𝑠𝑗|g,m𝐿 × 𝑠gm𝐿 + 𝜆𝐵 × 𝑠𝑗|g,m𝐵 × 𝑠gm𝐵  ,   (2) 
where 𝜆𝐿 + 𝜆𝐵 = 1; 𝑠𝑗|g,m𝑡  is within group share of product 𝑗 among type t consumers in market 
m; and 𝑠gm𝑡  is the share of group g among type t consumers in market m.11
 The demand for product j is given by:  
  Note that 𝜃 is the 
vector of demand parameters to be estimated, which consists of the taste for product 
characteristics of both consumer types (𝛽𝐿  and 𝛽𝐵 ), the marginal utility of price of both 
consumer types (𝛼𝐿 and 𝛼𝐵), the parameter that captures correlation of consumers’ utility across 
products belonging to the same group (𝜎), and the probability of type L consumer (𝜆𝐿).  𝜆𝐵 is 
obtained by 𝜆𝐵 = 1 − 𝜆𝐿.   
                                    𝑑𝑗𝑚 = 𝑀 × 𝑠𝑗𝑚(𝐱,𝐩, 𝝃,𝜃) ,                            (3) 
where M is a measure of the market size, which is assumed to be the geometric mean across 
origin city and destination city populations for a given market.12
  
   
 
                                                 
11 The well-know expressions for the within group and group share functions are: 
𝑠𝑗|g,m𝑡 = exp [(𝑥𝑗𝑚𝛽𝑡+𝛼𝑡𝑝𝑗𝑚+𝜉𝑗𝑚) (1−𝜎)⁄ ]𝐷gtm  and 𝑠gm𝑡 = 𝐷g𝑡𝑚1−𝜎1+∑ 𝐷g𝑡𝑚1−𝜎𝐺g=1  respectively, where 
𝐷gtm = ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [�𝑥𝑗𝑚𝛽𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑝𝑗𝑚 + 𝜉𝑗𝑚� (1 − 𝜎)⁄ ]𝑗∈𝒢g . 
12 For comparative purposes we also estimate two more restrictive discrete choice models of demand: (1) the 
standard logit model; and (2) the simple nested logit model.  Results associated with these more restrictive models 
are available upon request.  
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4.2 Markups and Marginal Cost 
 We assume that carriers simultaneously choose prices as in a static Bertrand-Nash model 
of differentiated products.  Let each carrier f offer for sale a set 𝐹𝑓𝑚 of products in market m.  
Firm f's variable profit in market m is given by:  
                         𝜋𝑓𝑚 = ∑ �𝑝𝑗𝑚 −𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚�𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑗∈ 𝐹𝑓𝑚  ,                          (4) 
where 𝑞𝑗𝑚 = 𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝐩) in equilibrium, 𝑞𝑗𝑚  is the quantity of travel tickets for product j sold in 
market m, 𝑑𝑗𝑚(𝐩) is the market demand for product j in equation (3), 𝐩 is a vector of prices for 
the J products in market m, and 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚 is the marginal cost of product j in market m.   
The corresponding first-order conditions are:  
     ∑ (𝑝𝑟𝑚 −𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑚) 𝜕𝑠𝑟𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑟∈ 𝐹𝑓𝑚 + 𝑠𝑗𝑚(𝐱,𝐩, 𝝃,𝜃) = 0         for all 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽      (5) 
which can be re-written in matrix notation as: 
                              s(p) + (Ω ∗ Δ) × (p − mc) = 0 ,           (6) 
where p, mc, and s(∙) are 𝐽 × 1 vectors of product prices, marginal costs, and predicted product 
shares respectively, while Ω * Δ is an element-by-element multiplication of two matrices.  Δ is a 
𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of first-order derivatives of model predicted product shares with respect to prices, 
where element Δ𝑗𝑟 = 𝜕𝑠𝑟(∙)𝜕𝑝𝑗 .  Ω is a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones that 
describes carriers’ ownership structure of the 𝐽  products, which in effect captures groups of 
products in the market that are jointly priced.  Based on equation (6), the markup equation can be 
obtained as: 
                                    Markup = p − mc = − (Ω * Δ) −1  s(p) .       (7) 
Finally, the marginal cost equation is specified as: 
                         𝑙𝑛(𝐦𝐜) = 𝒘𝛾 + 𝜼 ,                                       (8) 
where 𝒘  is a matrix of observed marginal cost-shifting variables, 13  𝛾  is a vector of cost 
parameters to be estimated, and 𝜼 is a vector of cost shocks that is unobserved by researchers.14
                                                 
13 Based on our previous discussion in the data section, 𝑤𝑗𝑚 includes: Itinerary distance flown measured in thousand 
miles (variable is denoted as Distance), itinerary distance squared (variable denoted as Distance2), HUB_MC 
dummy, Slot_MC dummy and operating carrier dummies. 
 
The supply equation implied by equations (7) and (8) is therefore,  
14 Given certain limitations of our data, we must acknowledge that it is difficult to accurately estimate the true 
marginal cost of adding one more passenger to a flight.  For example, marginal cost may vary substantially 
12 
 
   𝑙𝑛[𝐩 −𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝(𝐱,𝐩, 𝝃,𝜃)] = 𝒘𝛾 + 𝜼 .    (9) 
 
5. Estimation 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is used to estimate the demand and marginal 
cost parameters jointly.  First we describe how moment conditions are constructed from the 
demand-side of the model, and then describe how other moment conditions are constructed from 
the supply-side of the model.  
 To construct moment conditions used for identifying demand parameters, we first solve 
the demand model for the vector of unobserved product characteristics, 𝝃, as a function of 
product characteristics measured in the data and demand parameters, i.e., 𝝃(𝐱,𝐩,𝑺,𝜃).  We 
follow the numerical contraction mapping technique outlined in Berry and Jia (2010) to solve the 
model to obtain 𝝃𝑗𝑚.
15
The demand error term, 𝝃𝑗𝑚, is used to construct the following moment conditions: 
   
                             𝑚𝑑 = 1𝑛 𝑍𝑑′ 𝝃(𝐱,𝐩,𝑺,𝜃) = 0,                                      (10) 
where n is the number of observations in the sample, and 𝑍𝑑is a 𝑛 × 𝐿𝑑 matrix of instruments.   
The marginal cost error term η is obtained from equation (9) as follows:  
                                    𝜼 = 𝑙𝑛[𝐩 −𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝(𝐱,𝐩, 𝝃,𝜃)] − 𝑤𝛾,                                (11) 
which is then used to generate the supply-side moment conditions: 
                                    𝑚𝑠 = 1𝑛 𝑍𝑠′𝜼(𝐰,𝐩,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝, 𝛾) = 0.                           (12) 
 We combine moment conditions from equations (10) and (12) into a single GMM 
objective function and jointly estimate parameters in the demand and marginal cost equations.  
The GMM optimization problem is: 
                                     𝑀𝑖𝑛θ,�𝛾� �𝑚�𝜃,� 𝛾��′𝑊𝑚(𝜃�, 𝛾�)�,                                      (13) 
where 𝑚�𝜃�, 𝛾�� = �𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑠�, and W is the following block diagonal positive definite weight matrix:  
                                                                                                                                                             
depending on how full a flight is, but or data do not contain volume of passengers on a given flight relative to the 
seating capacity of the flight.     
15 For the simple nested logit model, the unobservable 𝝃𝑗𝑚 is computed analytically using:   𝝃𝑗𝑚 = 𝑦𝑗𝑚 − [𝑥𝑗𝑚𝛽𝑡 +
𝛼𝑡𝑝𝑗𝑚 + 𝜎𝑙𝑛�𝑺𝑗 𝑔⁄ �], where 𝑦𝑗𝑚 = 𝑙𝑛�𝑺𝑗𝑚� − 𝑙𝑛(𝑺0𝑚), 𝑺0𝑚 is the observed share of the outside good (g=0), and 
𝑺𝑗 𝑔⁄  is the observed within group share of product j.  Analogous expressions in case of the standard logit demand 
model can easily be obtained by setting 𝜎 = 0 in the expressions for the simple nested logit model. 
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   𝑊 = ��1𝑛 𝑍𝑑′ 𝝃𝝃′𝑍𝑑�−1 𝟎
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−1�. 
 Due to the fact that prices and within group product shares are endogenous, we need 
instruments that are associated with these endogenous variables but not with the error terms. 
Following much of the literature on discrete choice models of demand, we make the admittedly 
strong identifying assumption that observed non-price product characteristics are uncorrelated 
with unobserved product quality, 𝝃, or unobserved marginal cost, 𝜼.16  Similar to Gayle (2013, 
2007a, 2007b), Gayle and Brown (2014), and Brown (2010), we create the following instruments: 
(1) the number of substitute products offered by an airline in a market; (2) the number of 
competitor products in the market; (3) the number of competing products with equivalent 
number of intermediate stops offered by other carriers; (4) the squared deviation of a product's 
itinerary distance from the average itinerary distance of competing products offered by other 
carriers; (5) the sums and averages, by airline, of the Inconvenience and Interstop variables;17
 The instruments are motivated by standard supply theory, which predicts that equilibrium 
price is affected by the size of markup.  In other words, the instruments are assumed to influence 
the size of an airline's markup on each of its products.  For example, a product’s markup is 
constrained by the “closeness” of competing products in characteristics space, which is the 
rationale for instruments (3) and (4).  A product’s markup is constrained by the number of 
competing products in the market, which is the rationale for instrument (2).  A firm typically can 
achieve a marginally higher markup on a given product the more substitute products it owns in 
the market, which is the rationale for instrument (1).  Instruments in (5) are based on the idea that 
the average markup that a firm is able to charge is related to the characteristics of its products.  In 
addition, instruments in (5) are likely associated with passengers’ preference for products offered 
by one airline relative to the products offered by another.  
 
and (6) interactions of these instrument variables.  
  
5.1 Identification of  𝜆𝐿 in Demand Model 
Since the data do not explicitly provide information on passengers’ purpose of travel (e.g. 
business versus leisure), a reasonable question to ask at this point is: What feature of the data is 
                                                 
16 For example, see Berry and Jia (2010) and Peters (2006) for similar identifying assumptions. 
17 See the data section for definition and explanation of the Inconvenience and Interstop variables.      
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responsible for identifying parameter 𝜆𝐿  in the demand model, which measures the mean 
proportion of leisure/price-sensitive type consumers across markets?  The answer is that as long 
as leisure travelers tend to purchase products that, on average, have product characteristics that 
differ from the characteristics of products typically purchased by business travelers (e.g. products 
may contrast in their price levels and/or levels of itinerary travel convenience), then this 
contrasting consumer choice behavior in the data identifies 𝜆𝐿.   
      
6. Results  
6.1 Parameter Estimates 
Table 2 reports parameter estimates of the demand and marginal cost equations.  We first 
discuss the demand parameter estimates. 18
All demand parameter estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels of 
statistical significance. Recall that the random coefficients logit demand model we specify 
allows us to disentangle choice behavior for two types of consumers.  First, for each type of 
consumer the negative coefficient estimates for the Price and Interstop variables suggest that a 
consumer’s utility tends to decrease when the market fare or the number of intermediate stops 
increase.  In other words, irrespective of consumer type, consumers most prefer cheap nonstop 
flights between their origin and destination.  The consumer-type specific coefficient estimates on 
Price suggest that type L consumers (leisure travelers) are much more sensitive to price changes 
compared to type B consumers (business travelers).  Therefore, the evidence suggests that the 
two types of consumers view a product differently with respect to their marginal utilities of price.  
Furthermore, the consumer-type specific coefficient estimates on Interstop suggest that leisure 
travelers are less sensitive to intermediate stops compared to business travelers. 
 
An airline may offer several different single-intermediate stop products in a given market 
that differ based on the location of the intermediate stop and the flying distance required to get to 
the destination.  The negative coefficient estimate on Inconvenience suggests that, among 
                                                 
18 A Hausman test confirms that price and within group product share variables are indeed endogenous at 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  The computed Hausman test statistic, which is chi-square distributed, 
has a value of 271.46.  When the demand model is estimated without instruments the price coefficient is positive and 
𝜎 is almost twice as large, which suggest bias due to endogeneity.  As such, we believe that our instruments do a 
reasonable job in mitigating endogeneity problems.  To give the reader a sense of the importance of using 
instruments in estimation of the demand equation, in Table B1 in Appendix B we report single-equation estimation 
of the nested logit demand model with and without using instruments.   
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products with the same number of intermediate stops, consumers prefer to choose the product 
that uses the shortest route to get to their destination. 
 
 
Table 2: Joint Estimation of Demand and Marginal Cost Equations 
 Demand Equation 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error)  
    
Type L Consumer    
Price  -18.054* (0.042)  
Interstop  -1.3139* (0.057)  
Constant  -6.0683* (0.194)  
Type B Consumer   
 Price  -2.2497* (0.120)  
Interstop  -1.3866* (0.478)  
Constant  -7.0452* (0.384)  
Inconvenience -1.0171* (0.009)  
HUB_Origin 1.0216* (0.007)  
Tour 0.7379* (0.008)  
Slot-control -0.5419* (0.007)  
𝜎 0.1787* (0.002)  
𝜆𝐿 0.4110
* (0.055)  
 Marginal Cost Equation 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error)  
Constant -2.775* (0.053)  
Distance 0.297* (0.034)  
Distance2 -0.065* (0.011)  
HUB_MC 0.027* (0.008)  
Slot_MC 0.026* (0.009)  
    
GMM objective 19428 
  
Number of obs.   11425 
    * represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
  Ticketing (operating) carrier dummy variables are included in the demand (marginal cost)  
  model for estimation even though the associated coefficient estimates are not reported in  
  the table.   
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Consistent with documented evidence in the existing literature, the HUB_Origin 
coefficient estimate is positive, which indicates that a carrier is more likely to be chosen by 
consumers if the origin airport is the carrier’s hub.  Such consumer choice behavior is expected 
because a carrier is likely to offer convenient gate access and a superior menu of departure 
options from their hub airport.19
A consumer’s utility is likely to be lower if he/she chooses a product that requires travel 
through a slot-controlled airport, which is consistent with the negative coefficient estimate on the 
Slot-control variable.  A reason for lower consumer utility associated with these products is 
owing to longer wait time due to congestion at slot-controlled airports. 
  As suggested in Berry and Jia (2010), the positive Tour dummy 
coefficient estimate captures the relatively high traffic volume in Florida and Las Vegas that 
cannot be explained by the observed product attributes.   
As expected, the parameter estimate 𝜎 lies between 0 and 1, which in our demand model 
specification measures the correlation of consumers' utility across products belonging to the 
same airline.  The point estimate of 𝜎  is 0.1787, which suggests that there is correlation of 
preferences for products belonging to a given airline, but this correlation does not seem to be 
economically strong since the correlation value is substantially less than 1.  The estimate of 𝜆𝐿 is 
0.41, indicating that 41 percent of consumers in the sample markets are type L. 
 We now discuss coefficient estimates in the marginal cost equation.  The sign pattern of 
the coefficient estimates on itinerary distance flown variables (Distance and Distance2) suggests 
that marginal cost has an inverted-U relationship with itinerary distance flown, i.e., marginal cost 
is positively related to itinerary distance up to some distance threshold, then negatively related to 
itinerary distance at relatively longer distances.  This finding is consistent with an argument 
made by Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), which says that at relatively short distances, the 
superior cruising efficiency of larger planes may not dominate their larger takeoff and landing 
costs, and, therefore, the marginal cost is increasing in distance at relatively short distances.  
However, at relatively long distances, it becomes optimal to use larger planes, since their 
cruising efficiency may dominate their higher takeoff and landing costs, which eventually causes 
the marginal cost to decline in distance. 
The positive coefficient estimates on HUB_MC and Slot_MC suggest that marginal cost 
is higher if an airport on the product itinerary is the carrier’s HUB or a slot-controlled airport.  
                                                 
19 See discussions in Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006), Berry (1990), Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein (1991).  
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Channeling passengers through the airline’s hub normally allows the airline to better exploit 
economies of passenger-traffic density since passengers from different origins and with different 
destinations can eventually be put on a single large plane for a segment of the trip.  This should 
have a downward pressure on marginal cost. 20   However, as suggested by arguments in 
Borenstein and Rose (2007) and Mayer and Sinai (2003), often time hub airports are congested, 
which could cause flight delays and ultimately puts an upward pressure on cost for the airline. 21
 
  
Therefore, the coefficient estimate on HUB_MC captures the net effect of these opposing forces, 
and possibly others.          
6.2 Own-price Elasticity of Demand 
Using the parameter estimates in Table 2, we compute average own- and cross-price 
elasticities of demand, but first we discuss the own-price elasticity estimates.  Own-price 
elasticity measures the percentage change in demand for an air travel product in response to a 
percentage change in price of that product.  The own-price elasticity for product j is computed as, 
ϵ𝑗𝑗 = 𝜕𝑠𝑗(∙)𝜕𝑝𝑗 × 𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑗 , where s𝑗(∙)  is the predicted product share function specified in equation (2) and 
footnote 11.  Product j is either a nonstop product or an intermediate-stop(s) product, with s𝑗(∙) 
and ϵ𝑗𝑗 being a function of the product's price, 𝑝𝑗, and non-price product characteristics, �𝑥𝑗 , 𝜉𝑗�.  
One measured non-price product characteristic, captured by variable "Interstop" in vector 𝑥𝑗, is 
the number of intermediate stops (0, 1 or 2) product j has.    
Table 3 reports summary statistics on own-price elasticity estimates across all products in 
the 773 markets, as well as summary statistics on own-price elasticity estimates for nonstop and 
intermediate-stop(s) products separately.  The own-price elasticity estimates are statistically 
different from zero at conventional levels of significance.  The mean own-price elasticity 
estimate generated by our demand model is -1.92.  Oum, Gillen and Noble (1986), and Brander 
and Zhang (1990) argue that a reasonable range for own-price elasticity in the airline industry is 
from -1.2 to -2.0.  Peters (2006) study of the airline industry produces own-price elasticity 
estimates ranging from -3.2 to -3.6, while Berry and Jia (2010) find own-price elasticity 
estimates ranging from -1.89 to -2.10 in their 2006 sample.  Therefore, we are comfortable that 
                                                 
20 See Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006) and Brueckner and Spiller (1994). 
21 For a detailed analysis of the theory of congestion and delays, see Brueckner (2002) and Morrison and Winston 
(2008).      
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the elasticity estimates generated from our model are reasonable and accord with evidence in the 
existing literature.  
The own-price elasticity estimates indicate that consumers are sensitive to a price change, 
irrespective of whether the product is nonstop or requires intermediate stop(s).  However, the 
average consumer responds differently when facing a price change of a nonstop product 
compared to an equivalent percent price change of an intermediate-stop(s) product.  Specifically, 
it is noticeable that consumers are more price-sensitive in the case of intermediate-stop(s) 
products compared to nonstop products, and the price-sensitivity differences across the two 
product types are statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance as 
revealed by statistical comparisons in the middle panel of Table 3.             
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Own-Price Elasticity Estimates 
 No. of 
markets 
Both Types of 
Consumers Type L Consumers Type B Consumers 
  Mean (se) Mean (se) Mean (se) 
  
      All Products 773 -1.924* (0.005) -4.274* (0.037) -0.530* (0.005) 
Nonstop Products 773 -1.802* (0.007) -4.061* (0.043) -0.501* (0.005) 
Intermediate-stop(s) Products 773 -1.981
* (0.007) -4.390* (0.050) -0.546* (0.006) 
  
Statistical Comparison of Mean Difference in Own-price 
Elasticity Estimates across the two Product Types   
Intermediate-stop(s) versus Nonstop 
Products 773 -0.1796
* (0.010) -0.3297* (0.066) -0.0444* (0.008) 
 
 
Summary Statistics for Own-price Elasticity Estimates Broken 
Down by Market Nonstop Flight Distance between Origin and 
Destination 
 
       
Short-haul distance markets (less than 
500 miles) 26 -1.857
* 
 
(0.024) 
 
-3.454* (0.183) 
 
-0.429* (0.023) 
 
Mid-haul distance markets (between 
500 and 1500 miles) 499 -1.944
* 
 
(0.007) 
 
-3.988* (0.042) 
 
-0.495* (0.005) 
 
Long-haul distance markets (greater 
than 1500 miles) 248 -1.893
* 
 
(0.010) 
 
-4.936* (0.058) 
 
-0.613* (0.007) 
  
* represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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The consumer-type-specific elasticity estimates indicate that leisure travelers (Type L) 
are much more price-sensitive compared to business travelers (Type B).  Overall, a 1% increase 
in price causes leisure travelers to decrease their demand for the product by 4.27%, while 
business travelers would only decrease their demand by 0.53%.  Leisure travelers are likely more 
sensitive to price changes because they have more flexibility in their travel schedule and usually 
have a more restrictive travel budget.  The price-sensitivity gap between leisure and business 
travelers is wider in the case of intermediate-stop(s) products (-4.39 versus -0.546) compared to 
the price-sensitivity gap for nonstop products (-4.06 versus -0.50).   
 In the bottom panel of the table we decompose the own-price elasticity estimates 
according to market nonstop flight distance categories.  Consumers seem to be less price-
sensitive in short-haul distance markets relative to long-haul distance markets, which is 
consistent with findings in Bhadra (2003).  It is possible that many of the passengers who choose 
to use air travel on relatively short distances are business travelers.  They likely purchase flight 
tickets at the last moment and have little or no chance to respond to price changes. 22
 
     
6.3 Cross-price Elasticity of Demand 
Cross-price elasticities relevant to our study measure the percentage change in demand 
for intermediate-stop(s) products in response to a percentage change in price of nonstop 
products.  The cross-price elasticity of demand between products r and j is computed as, ϵ𝑗𝑟 = 
𝜕𝑠𝑟(∙)
𝜕𝑝𝑗
× 𝑝𝑗
𝑠𝑟
.  For the computed ϵ𝑗𝑟, we focus on cases in which product r is an intermediate-stop(s) 
product, while product j is a nonstop product.  Summary statistics for cross-price elasticity 
estimates across all markets are reported in Table 4. 
Overall, across the 773 markets in our sample, the positive and statistically significant 
cross-price elasticity of demand estimates indicate that intermediate-stop(s) products and nonstop 
products are substitutes.  The mean cross-price elasticity is 0.01248, and this estimate is 
statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance. 
Compared to business travelers, leisure travelers perceive intermediate-stop(s) products 
and nonstop products as closer substitutes.  A 1% increase in the price of nonstop products 
                                                 
22 The different own-price elasticity for short-haul distance relative to long-haul distance markets may be partly due 
to differences in product characteristics across markets with contrasting distance haul.  We leave it to future research 
to identify the relative importance of various product characteristics that influence the contrasting own-price 
elasticity across short-haul distance versus long-haul distance markets. 
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causes leisure travelers to increase their demand for intermediate-stop(s) products by 0.024%, 
but only causes business travelers to increase their demand for intermediate-stop(s) products by 
0.0034%. 23
 
  In other words, leisure travelers are more willing than business travelers to switch 
to intermediate-stop(s) products when facing an increase in price of nonstop products, suggesting 
that leisure travelers are more willing to tolerate intermediate stops compared to business 
travelers.    
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Cross-Price Elasticity Estimates 
 No. of 
markets 
Both Types of 
Consumers 
Type L Consumers Type B Consumers 
 Mean (se) Mean (se) Mean (se) 
        
All markets 773 0.01248* (0.0004) 0.02428* (0.0008) 0.00336* (0.0001) 
Short-haul distance markets 26 0.00620* (0.0017) 0.00855* (0.0024) 0.00148* (0.0004) 
Mid-haul distance markets 499 0.01399* (0.0006) 0.02511* (0.0011) 0.00349* (0.0001) 
Long-haul distance markets 248 0.01009* (0.0005) 0.02426* (0.0013) 0.00330* (0.0002) 
* represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4 also breaks down the cross-price elasticity estimates by market nonstop flight 
distance between the origin and destination.  Within each distance category, the results show that 
the mean cross-price elasticities are statistically different from zero at conventional levels of 
significance.  These results suggest that consumers perceive intermediate-stop(s) products and 
nonstop products as substitutable in all distance categories of air travel markets.  Furthermore, 
irrespective of whether the market distance is short-haul, mid-haul, or long-haul, leisure travelers 
are more willing to switch to intermediate-stop(s) products compared to business travelers in 
response to an increase in price of nonstop products.  Again, it is evident that leisure travelers are 
more flexible to change their travel schedule in response to price changes.    
It is notable that consumers in short-haul distance markets are less willing to switch to an 
intermediate-stop(s) product in response to an increase in price of a nonstop product.  A possible 
explanation for this result is that the share of total trip time represented by connecting time grows 
                                                 
23 A t-test is used here to confirm that at conventional levels of statistical significance there is a statistically 
significant difference in mean cross-price elasticity between leisure travelers and business travelers.  The difference 
in mean cross-price elasticities (0.0242-0.0034) is 0.0209 and the standard error of the difference is 0.00083, which 
implies a t-statistic of 25.21.  
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as the total trip distance falls.  As the time burden of connecting travel increases with shorter trip 
distances, passengers are less willing to switch to intermediate-stop(s) products for a given 
increase in the price of a nonstop product. 24
Table 5 reports statistical comparisons of mean cross-price elasticity estimates across 
different market distances.  Specifically, the table reports the difference in mean cross-price 
elasticities for markets in two distinct distance-haul categories.  For example, the first data entry 
in the table of 0.00779 is computed by subtracting the mean cross-price elasticity for short-haul 
distance markets from the mean cross-price elasticity for mid-haul distance markets.  The results 
suggest that there is a statistically significant difference in mean cross-price elasticity between 
short-haul and mid-haul distance markets.  However, when separate consumer types are 
accounted for, there is not a significant mean difference between mid-haul and long-haul 
distance markets. 
  Another notable observation from the data in Table 
4 is that the average cross-price elasticity increases from short-haul distance market to mid-haul 
distance market, but decreases a bit from mid-haul distance market to long-haul distance market.   
 
Table 5: Statistical Comparison of Mean Difference in Cross-price Elasticity across 
Markets in Different Distance Categories 
Market Distance  
Category Comparison 
Both Types of 
Consumers 
Type L  
Consumers 
Type B  
Consumers 
Mean (se) Mean (se) Mean (se) 
       
Mid- vs. Short-haul 0.00779* (0.0018) 0.01657* (0.0026) 0.00201* (0.0004) 
       
Long- vs. Mid-haul -0.0039* (0.0008) -0.0009 (0.0017) -0.0002 (0.0002) 
       
Long- vs. Short-haul 0.00389* (0.0018) 0.00182 (0.0027) 0.00182* (0.0004) 
       
* represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
                                                 
24 We are very thankful to an anonymous referee for providing this explanation for why consumers in short-haul 
markets are less willing to switch to an intermediate-stop(s) product in response to an increase in price of a nonstop 
product.  
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It may be argued that the distance categories used in the previous tables are arbitrary.  As 
such, using an approach that is more flexible than the distance categories, we investigate a 
potential relationship between computed cross-price elasticities and the nonstop market distance.  
In particular, we estimate the following regression via ordinary least squares (OLS):   
  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖2 + 𝜀𝑖, 
where 𝑌𝑖 is the cross-price elasticity in market i, which is regressed on the market nonstop flight 
distance (Dist) and distance squared (Dist2).  Table 6 shows the results of the OLS regression.   
The parameter estimates suggest that cross-price elasticity is increasing with distance 
between the origin and destination cities up to some threshold distance, but decline in distance 
thereafter.  In other words, the evidence suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
cross-price elasticity and nonstop flight distance between origin and destination cities.  The 
estimated distance threshold point seems to be approximately 1500 miles.  These results are 
roughly consistent with the arbitrary distance category analysis done previously.       
 
 
Table 6: Parameter Estimates for the Relationship 
between Cross-price Elasticities and Market Nonstop Distance 
 
Both Types Type L Type B 
of Consumers Consumers 
Dist 
Consumers 
5.44E-06 2.01E-05* 2.21E-06* 
 
(3.72E-06) (7.31E-06) (9.98E-07) 
Dist2 -2.65E-09* -6.36E-09* -7.37E-10* 
 
(1.23E-09) (2.41E-09) (3.29E-10) 
Constant 0.01077* 0.011041* 0.00198* 
 
(0.00247) (0.00486) (0.00066) 
R-squared 0.0207 0.0099 0.0065 
Distance 
Threshold 1027 1582 1501 
* represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The distance threshold is computed by, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 = − 𝛼1
2𝛼2
. 
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6.4 Markup and Marginal Cost Analysis 
           The parameter estimates in the demand model along with an assumption that airlines set 
prices according to a Nash equilibrium allow us to compute product-level markups and marginal 
costs, which are summarized in Table 7. 
The estimates suggest that, on average, a nonstop product enjoys larger markup (about 7 
dollars more) than an intermediate-stop(s) product, which is consistent with our expectations.  
Based on our previous results on own-price elasticity of demand, we believe that price-sensitive 
consumers are more likely to buy intermediate-stop(s) products compared to nonstop products.  
In addition, standard static oligopoly theory tells us that the more price-sensitive consumers are, 
the lower the markup firms are able to charge.  Thus, the markups reflect the differing choice 
behavior of dissimilar consumer types across nonstop and intermediate-stop(s) products.    
      
Table 7: Summary Statistics for Markup and Marginal Cost (in Dollars) 
    Mean Std. Dev. 
Markup  
   All products 129.904 41.536 
Nonstop products 135.059 51.285 
Intermediate-stop(s) products 127.622 42.239 
    
Marginal Cost 
  All products 83.048 22.415 
Nonstop products 83.185 35.249 
Intermediate-stop(s) products 82.561 14.487 
 
 
As we previously discussed in the subsection on own-price elasticities, our own-price 
elasticity estimates are within the range of those obtained by other researchers [see for example 
Berry and Jia (2010), Brander and Zhang (1990), Oum, Gillen and Noble (1986), and Peters 
(2006)].  Since standard static oligopoly theory predicts that product markups are determined by 
price elasticity of demand, then product markups generated by our model will be similar to 
product markups implied by the elasticity estimates of other researchers. 
The mean itinerary distance flown for products in our sample is 1662 miles, while the 
mean marginal cost estimate is $83.05.  Therefore, the implied marginal cost per mile is about 5 
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cents.  Berry and Jia (2010) estimate their econometric model on data in the year 2006 and find a 
marginal cost per mile estimate of 6 cents, which they argue is plausible based on carriers’ 
reported costs.  As such, we believe our marginal cost estimate is within the “ballpark” of what is 
expected. 
 
6.5 Counterfactual Analyses      
The goal of the counterfactual analyses is to assess the extent to which the presence of 
intermediate-stop(s) products influences the pricing of nonstop products.  We implement three 
counterfactual experiments, which we now discuss in turn. 
 
 6.5.1 Counterfactual Experiment 1  
Essentially Counterfactual Experiment 1 is done by removing intermediate-stop(s) 
products from each sample market, then assuming the previously estimated product marginal 
costs and preference parameters are unchanged,25
A common feature of all three counterfactual experiments is that we artificially remove 
intermediate-stop(s) products from each sample market.  Due to this feature of the experiments it 
is tempting to dismiss them on the grounds that it is hard to imagine a situation in which 
policymakers require that intermediate-stop(s) products be removed from a particular market.  
However, the primary purpose of the counterfactual experiments is not to analyze equilibrium 
outcomes of market scenarios that could arise from policymakers’ actions, but instead these 
experiments are simply being used as mere tools to assess the extent to which the presence of 
intermediate-stop(s) products influences the pricing of nonstop products. 
 we use the supply-side of the model to solve 
for new equilibrium prices for nonstop products.  A comparison of the actual nonstop products’ 
prices with their model predicted equilibrium prices when intermediate-stop(s) products are 
counterfactually removed reveals the extent to which the presence of intermediate-stop(s) 
products influences the pricing of nonstop products.  
 Formally, in the spirit of Petrin (2002), Nevo (2000) and others, we first use estimated 
markups, actual prices and equation (7) to recover product marginal costs as follows: 
                                                 
25 We concede that marginal cost and preferences may be different in a world that does not have intermediate-stop(s) 
products.  Such ceteris paribus assumptions are typical in the literature when using structural models to perform 
counterfactual analyses.  For example, see Nevo (2000) and Petrin (2002).  However, Counterfactual Experiment 2 
and Counterfactual Experiment 3, which we subsequently describe, relax the assumption that marginal cost of 
nonstop products is unchanged when intermediate-stop(s) products are counterfactually removed.  
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           𝐦𝐜� = 𝐩 + (Ω ∗ Δ) −1  s(p),                                (14) 
where 𝐦𝐜�  is the estimated marginal cost vector.  Second, we eliminate intermediate-stop(s) 
products, and holding recovered marginal cost constant for the remaining products, we 
numerically solve for the new nonstop product price vector, 𝐩𝐧𝐬∗ , that satisfies: 
            𝐩𝐧𝐬∗ = 𝐦𝐜� 𝐧𝐬 − [𝛀𝐧𝐬 ∗ 𝚫𝐧𝐬(𝐩𝐧𝐬∗ )] −1 × 𝐬𝐧𝐬(𝐩𝐧𝐬∗ ),                             (15) 
where equation (15) is only for nonstop products.  Finally, we compare the counterfactual 
equilibrium price vector 𝐩𝐧𝐬∗  to actual nonstop product prices in vector 𝐩 to see the influence that 
intermediate-stop(s) products may have on the equilibrium prices of nonstop products.   
Before we examine the results of counterfactual experiment 1, it is useful to discuss what 
forces are at play in the market equilibrium analysis.  In other words, do we expect equilibrium 
prices of nonstop products to fall, rise, or remain the same when intermediate-stop(s) products 
are counterfactually removed, and what does the predicted price change depend on?  We argue 
that there are potentially three demand-elasticity-driven effects simultaneously at work that may 
influence the predicted equilibrium price change of nonstop products: (1) the market power 
effect; (2) the multi-product firm effect; and (3) the price-sensitivity effect. 
The most intuitive of the three effects is the market power effect.  This effect simply 
refers to the increased ability and incentive of carriers to raise the price of the remaining products 
if competing substitute products are removed from the market.  Perhaps this effect is most 
relevant for the purposes of antitrust analyses.26
The multi-product firm effect refers to the situation in which, if the product that is 
removed from the market is one of several substitute products offered by a firm, then this firm 
has an incentive to marginally reduce the price on its remaining products.  The intuition is the 
following.  A multi-product firm selling substitute products tends to price these products 
marginal higher than if it were single-product firms selling the same set of products because a 
marginal increase in the price of one product raises the demand for the substitute products.  In 
other words, each substitute product effectively has a positive demand externality on the others 
via its pricing.  While a multi-product firm can internalize these positive demand externalities 
across substitute products, single-product firms cannot, resulting in higher prices when the same 
set of substitute products are offered by a multi-product firm.  So if one of the several substitute 
products offered by a multi-product firm is removed from the market, this also effectively 
    
                                                 
26 We thank an anonymous referee for making this point. 
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removes the positive demand externality from pricing that this product imposed, and the multi-
product firm accounted for, when the firm optimally prices its other substitute product(s).  It is 
the effective removal of the positive demand externality that drives the multi-product firm to 
price its remaining substitute product(s) at a lower price.  In Appendix A we use a linear demand 
example to illustrate this effect.       
The price-sensitivity effect refers to the situation in which there is downward pressure on 
the price of a product when the price-sensitivity of consumers increases.  This effect is likely to 
exist in our counterfactual exercises since our previous results show that intermediate-stop(s) 
products tend to be consumed by more price-sensitive consumers compared to the consumers of 
nonstop products.  Therefore, by removing the intermediate-stop(s) products from the market, we 
in effect force carriers to optimally adjust the price of nonstop products for a more price-
sensitive set of consumers that do not have any other air travel product options.  This will put a 
downward pressure on the price of nonstop products. 
In summary, by counterfactually removing intermediate-stop(s) products from the 
market, the market power effect puts an upward pressure on the price of nonstop products, while 
the multi-product firm and price-sensitivity effects cause downward pressure on price.  Thus, 
what ultimately happens to the price of nonstop products depends on which effects dominate.       
Table 8 summarizes one way of examining the results of counterfactual experiment 1.  In 
particular, among the nonstop products in the sample, the table reports the number of these 
products with positive versus negative predicted percentage change in their equilibrium price.  
These results are broken down by whether or not the nonstop products were offered by carriers 
that also offered substitute intermediate-stop(s) products in the same market, i.e., single-product 
versus multi-product carriers.   
Note that for economy of presentation we omit reporting a column in Table 8 for number 
of nonstop products with zero price change.  For example, among the 813 nonstop products 
offered by single-product carriers, the information reported in Table 8 is saying that the model 
predicts price increases for 169 of these products, 28 predicted to have a price decrease, and the 
remaining 616 nonstop products predicted to have zero price change. 
First, we see that even in the case of single-product carriers in a market, as many as 28 
nonstop products offered by single-product carriers are predicted to experience a decrease in 
price.  Since the multi-product firm effect is not present for these products, we know that the 
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predicted price decreases are owing to the domination of the price-sensitivity effect over the 
market power effect.  Second, among the 2184 nonstop products offered by multi-product 
carriers, the model predicts that 463 of them will have price increases, while 236 of them will 
have price decreases.  Therefore, the majority of these nonstop product prices are predicted to 
either remain the same or fall, suggesting that the market power effect is often dominated by 
either or both of the other two effects.   
 
Table 8: Number of Nonstop Products with certain Predicted Percentage Change  
in Equilibrium Price for Single-product and Multi-product carriers in a Market 
  
No. of 
Products 
 
 
No. of 
Products 
with  
Positive 
% Change 
No. of 
Products 
with  
Negative 
% Change 
    
Single-product carriers 813 169 28 
Multi-product carriers 2184 463 236 
    
Total  2997 632 264 
 
 
We now examine results of counterfactual experiment 1 in terms of actual predicted 
percent price changes for nonstop products, rather than mere direction of the predicted price 
changes previously discussed.  Results for actual predicted price changes are reported in Table 9.  
Results reveal that mean prices of nonstop products are predicted to increase in only a few 
markets (137 out of 773 markets), but these increases seem to be sufficiently large to yield an 
overall mean price increase of 0.098%.  The overall pattern of predicted price changes persists in 
mid-haul and long-haul distance markets, but not in short-haul distance markets.  In short-haul 
distance markets the model predicts a mean 0.0034% decline in the prices of nonstop products.  
Within the context of the ultimate objective of the counterfactual experiments, mean 
predicted price changes in Table 9 can alternatively be interpreted in the following manner.  
Accounting for the part of airlines' optimal pricing behavior that is driven by passengers' 
preferences over the substitutability (demand elasticities) between nonstop and intermediate-
stop(s) products, results from counterfactual experiment 1 suggest that the presence of 
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intermediate-stop(s) products causes the current prices of some nonstop products to be lower 
than they would otherwise be owing to the market power effect.  Furthermore, due to the multi-
product firm and price-sensitivity effects the presence of intermediate-stop(s) products causes the 
current prices of many nonstop products to be marginally higher than would otherwise be the 
case.   
In defining relevant product markets for antitrust purposes, 5% predicted change in price 
is typically used as an economically important threshold.27
The right-hand-side panel of Table 9 shows that only 2 of the 773 markets have mean 
predicted percent price increase greater than 5%, and no market has mean predicted percent price 
decrease less than -5%.  In summary, with the exception of 1 mid-haul distance and 1 long-haul 
distance markets, all markets have mean predicted price changes for nonstop products being less 
than 5%.  
  As such, for the remainder of the 
analysis we deem price changes that are at least 5% to be economically important changes.   
 
 
Table 9: Nonstop-products Predicted Percent Price Change  
for Different Market Distance Categories 
Markets No. of Markets Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
No. of Markets that lie within the 
Percent Price Change category 
> 0% > 5% < 0% < -5% 
All markets 773 0.0984 1.3553 -1.6441 30.759 137 2 79 0 
 
Markets by distance-
haul Categories          
    Short-haul markets 26 -0.0034 0.0176 -0.0885 0.0107 1 0 2 0 
    Mid-haul markets 499 0.0782 0.9466 -1.6441 20.007 103 1 54 0 
    Long-haul markets 248 0.1497 1.9824 -1.6104 30.759 33 1 23 0 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 For example, see Section 4.1 in U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010), “Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines”. 
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A Caveat of Counterfactual Experiment 1   
 A caveat of counterfactual experiment 1 is that we assume that marginal costs of nonstop 
products are unchanged when intermediate-stop(s) products are counterfactually removed from 
each market.  The presence of intermediate-stop(s) products in markets effectively influences the 
volume of passengers that travel on nonstop products, which in turn implies that the marginal 
cost of transporting passengers on nonstop products may be different were it not for the presence 
of intermediate-stop(s) products.  Depending on what adjustments airlines choose to make to 
accommodate passengers solely using nonstop products (e.g. use smaller planes with more 
flights versus use larger planes with fewer flights), the marginal cost of transporting passengers 
on nonstop products may either increase or decrease.  As such, the presence of intermediate-
stop(s) products in markets may indirectly influence the pricing of nonstop products via a 
marginal cost channel, which is separate from the demand elasticity-driven channel explored in 
counterfactual experiment 1. 
 The subsequent counterfactual analyses consider changes in marginal costs of nonstop 
products in evaluating the extent to which the presence of intermediate-stop(s) products 
influences the pricing of nonstop products.   
 
6.5.2 Counterfactual Experiment 2 
 Counterfactual Experiment 2 evaluates predicted changes in the prices of nonstop 
products when intermediate-stop(s) products are counterfactually removed from each market, 
and assuming that such product-type removal causes the marginal cost of nonstop products to 
uniformly increase by 5%.  To provide additional sensitivity analysis, Table B2 and Table B3 in 
Appendix B report results from experiments analogous to counterfactual experiment 2 
(Counterfactual Experiment 2A and Counterfactual Experiment 2B) with the only differences 
between these experiments compared to counterfactual experiment 2 being that instead of 
assuming marginal costs of nonstop products uniformly increase by 5%, we assume they 
uniformly increase by 2.5% in Counterfactual Experiment 2A, but uniformly decrease by 2.5% in 
Counterfactual Experiment 2B.  Operationally, the key differences between these experiments 
compared to counterfactual experiment 1, are that 𝐦𝐜� 𝒏𝒔 in equation (15) is replaced by 1.05 ×
𝐦𝐜� 𝒏𝒔 , 1.025 × 𝐦𝐜� 𝒏𝒔  or 0.975 × 𝐦𝐜� 𝒏𝒔  depending on whether we are implementing 
Counterfactual Experiment 2, Counterfactual Experiment 2A or Counterfactual Experiment 2B, 
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respectively.  Similar to counterfactual experiment 1, these counterfactual experiments capture 
the demand-elasticity-driven channel through which intermediate-stop(s) products may influence 
the pricing of nonstop products, but unlike counterfactual experiment 1, these counterfactual 
experiments additionally capture a marginal cost channel. 
 Analogous to Table 8 above, in the case of counterfactual experiment 2, Table 10 reports 
the number of nonstop products with positive or negative predicted percentage change in their 
equilibrium price.  In addition, Table 10 reports the number of nonstop products with greater 
than 5% or less than -5% predicted percentage change in their equilibrium price.  Compared to 
results in Table 8, Table 10 reveals that substantially more nonstop products will have predicted 
price increases in the event that the marginal cost of nonstop products uniformly increase by 5% 
due to removal of intermediate-stop(s) products.  Furthermore, counterfactual experiment 2 
shows that a substantial number of nonstop products (126 offered by single-product carriers, and 
362 offered by multi-product carriers) are predicted to have a price increase greater than 5%.  
Notwithstanding the assumed 5% increase in marginal cost of nonstop products caused by the 
removal of intermediate-stop(s) products, the vast majority of nonstop products (85% [=
�1 − 126
813
� × 100]  of the nonstop products offered by single-product carriers, and 83% [=
�1 − 362
2184
� × 100] of the nonstop products offered by multi-product carriers) are still predicted 
to have price changes below 5%.      
 
Table 10: Number of Nonstop Products with Positive vs. Negative Predicted 
Percentage Change in Equilibrium Price for Single-product and Multi-product carriers 
in a Market, Assuming the Counterfactual Elimination of Intermediate-stop(s) 
Products Causes Marginal Cost of Nonstop Products to Uniformly Increase by 5% 
  No. of Products 
No. of 
Products 
with  
Positive 
% Change 
No. of 
Products 
with  
5 % 
Change 
No. of 
Products 
with  
Negative 
% Change 
No. of 
Products 
with  
-5% 
Change 
      
Single-product carriers 813 467 126 54 25 
Multi-product carriers 2184 1007 362 200 61 
      
Total  2997 1474 488 254 86 
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 Within the context of the ultimate objective of the counterfactual experiments, the results 
in Table 10 can alternatively be interpreted in the following manner.  Assuming that the presence 
of intermediate-stop(s) products causes the marginal costs of nonstop products to be lower (about 
5%) than they would otherwise be, as well as accounting for the part of airlines' optimal pricing 
behavior that is driven by passengers' preferences over the substitutability (demand elasticities) 
between nonstop and intermediate-stop(s) products, results from counterfactual experiment 2 
suggest that the current prices of many nonstop products are lower than they would otherwise be 
owing to the presence of intermediate-stop(s) products.  However, given the assumptions of 
counterfactual experiment 2, for the vast majority of nonstop products (approximately 84% [= �1 − 126+362
813+2184
� × 100]) that are offered in markets with intermediate-stop(s) products, the 
presence of intermediate-stop(s) products either does not influence or causes the current prices of 
nonstop products to be higher than they would otherwise be.      
We now examine results of counterfactual experiment 2 in terms of actual predicted 
percent price changes for nonstop products.  Results for actual predicted price changes are 
reported in Table 11.  We see that the counterfactual removal of intermediate-stop(s) products 
would result in price increases of nonstop products by a mean 2.64%, 3.02% and 1.16% in short-
haul, mid-haul and long-haul distance markets respectively, with an overall mean 2.41% increase 
across all markets.  Note that even though counterfactual experiment 2 assumes that the marginal 
cost of nonstop products increases by 5% due to the removal of intermediate-stop(s) products, 
the model still predicts that some of these nonstop products will experience a price decrease, 
perhaps in part due to the demand-elasticity-driven multi-product carrier and price-sensitivity 
effects. 
Compared to counterfactual experiment 1, counterfactual experiment 2 shows that 
substantially more markets (109 markets) will experience a mean increase in the price of nonstop 
products greater than 5%.  While there exists markets in each distance category that have 
economically significant predicted price increases, the mean predicted increases are larger in 
short-haul and mid-haul distance markets.  It is useful to re-interpret these results within the 
context of the ultimate objective of the counterfactual experiments as follows.  Assuming that the 
presence of intermediate-stop(s) products causes the marginal costs of nonstop products to be 
uniformly lower (about 5%) than they would otherwise be, as well as accounting for the part of 
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airlines' optimal pricing behavior that is driven by passengers' preferences over the 
substitutability (demand elasticities) between nonstop and intermediate-stop(s) products, results 
from counterfactual experiment 2 suggest that in many (but far from a majority) markets the 
current prices of nonstop products are substantially lower than they would otherwise be owing to 
the presence of intermediate-stop(s) products.    
 
Table 11: Nonstop products Predicted Percent Price Change, Assuming the Counterfactual 
Elimination of Intermediate-stop(s) Products Causes Marginal Cost of Nonstop Products to 
Uniformly Increase by 5% 
Markets No. of Markets Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
No. of Markets that lie within the 
Percent Price Change category 
> 0% > 5% < 0% < -5% 
All markets 773 2.4145 6.0999 -12.705 103.317 370 109 52 6 
 
Markets by distance-
haul Categories          
    Short-haul markets 26 2.6421 1.6310 -1.0512 4.6539 21 0 1 0 
    Mid-haul markets 499 3.0249 5.5051 -12.705 56.066 290 97 29 2 
    Long-haul markets 248 1.1625 7.2520 -8.215 103.317 59 12 22 4 
  
 
6.5.3 Counterfactual Experiment 3 
 We already know from the previously discussed counterfactual experiments that if the 
presence of intermediate-stop(s) products causes the marginal costs of nonstop products to be 
uniformly lower by at most 5% than they would otherwise be, as well as accounting for the part 
of airlines' optimal pricing behavior that is driven by passengers' preferences over the 
substitutability (demand elasticities) between nonstop and intermediate-stop(s) products, then the 
presence of intermediate-stop(s) products in markets with nonstop products substantially 
influences the pricing of many nonstop products, but not a vast majority.  We now implement 
Counterfactual Experiment 3 to better understand the conditions necessary for the presence of 
intermediate-stop(s) products in markets with nonstop products to have an economically 
significant influence on the pricing of all nonstop products in these markets.  
 Counterfactual Experiment 3 poses a slightly different question than the experiments 
previously discussed.  Specifically, counterfactual experiment 3 asks: Assuming the 
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counterfactual removal of intermediate-stop(s) products causes the prices of all nonstop products 
to increase by the economically significant amount of 5%, by how much do marginal costs of 
these nonstop products need to change in equilibrium to facilitate such a price increase?  So 
instead of predicting equilibrium price changes as the previously discussed counterfactual 
experiments do, counterfactual experiment 3 predicts changes in marginal costs of nonstop 
products necessary to sustain a 5% increase in their price given the removal of intermediate-
stop(s) products.  Put another way, counterfactual experiment 3 tells us the extent to which the 
presence of intermediate-stop(s) products need to influence the marginal cost of nonstop 
products such that in equilibrium the presence of intermediate-stop(s) products causes the current 
prices of nonstop products to be about 5% lower than they would otherwise be.  Operationally, 
we set the prices in vector 𝐩𝐧𝐬∗  in equation (15) to be 5% higher than the actual prices of nonstop 
products, then solve for the vector of marginal costs, 𝐦𝐜� 𝒏𝒔∗ , that satisfy equation (15).    
 The results from counterfactual experiment 3 are reported in Table 12.  The results reveal 
that in order to sustain a 5% increase in the equilibrium prices of nonstop products in short-haul 
and mid-haul distance markets, the removal of intermediate-stop(s) products will need to cause 
the marginal costs of nonstop products to increase by a mean 6.26% and 2.92% across these 
distance-category markets respectively.  However, to sustain a 5% increase in the equilibrium 
prices of nonstop products in long-haul distance markets, the removal of intermediate-stop(s) 
products will need to cause the marginal costs of nonstop products to decrease by a mean 0.2%.   
Why might a decrease in marginal cost of nonstop products be required in some cases to 
sustain a uniform 5% increase in prices of these products?  This result can occur due to the joint 
reinforcing effects of prices being strategic complements, and the market power effect that 
results from eliminating intermediate-stop(s) products.  Prices are often strategic complements in 
static models of oligopoly,28
                                                 
28 See discussion in Chapter 5 in Tirole (1988). 
 i.e., an increase in the price of one product causes the price of 
competing products to rise in equilibrium.  The market power effect in these experiments causes 
upward pressure on the prices of nonstop products, and strategic complementarily between prices 
of nonstop products also causes upward pressure on the price of a given nonstop product when 
the prices of competing products increase.  Therefore, by removing intermediate-stop(s) 
products, as well as uniformly increasing the prices of competing nonstop products by 5%, can 
require that price of a given nonstop product increases by more than 5% to satisfy Nash 
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equilibrium conditions.  The nonstop products that require a greater than 5% price increase to 
satisfy Nash equilibrium conditions are the products that will require a reduction in marginal cost 
in order to limit their price increase to only 5%.  The results in Table 12 suggest that this 
equilibrium outcome is most likely in long-haul distance markets.          
 
 
Table 12: Nonstop-products Predicted Percent Change in Marginal Cost, 
Assuming the Counterfactual Elimination of Intermediate-stop(s) Products 
Causes Prices of Nonstop Products to Uniformly Increase by 5% 
Markets No. of Markets Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min Max 
All markets 773 2.029 4.930 -13.778 17.461 
      
Markets by distance-haul 
Categories 
   Short-haul markets 
 
 
26 
 
 
6.260 
 
 
4.455 
 
 
-7.872 
 
 
12.163 
   Mid-haul markets 499 2.916 4.608 -13.778 17.461 
   Long-haul markets 248 -0.200 4.763 -10.382 12.963 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
The key objective of this paper is to investigate the extent to which intermediate-stop(s) 
products influence the pricing of nonstop products.  Standard oligopoly theory pricing models 
suggest that there are primarily two channels through which intermediate-stop(s) products may 
influence the pricing of nonstop products: (1) a demand-elasticity-driven channel; and (2) a 
marginal cost channel.  The demand-elasticity-driven channel recognizes that the optimal 
markup an airline charges on a given product depends on the product's own-price elasticity as 
well as the product's cross-price elasticity with substitute products the airline also offers in the 
market.  The marginal cost channel recognizes that an airline's marginal cost of offering a given 
product in a market may depend on the other products that are also offered in the market.  We 
first conduct a separate and thorough investigation of own-price and cross-price elasticities 
between nonstop and intermediate-stop(s) products, which motivates and facilitates a separate 
analysis of the demand-elasticity-driven channel.  A subsequent investigation of the joint impact 
of the demand-elasticity-driven and marginal cost channels is then conducted.  
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Cross-price elasticity of demand estimates suggest that, on average, consumers perceive 
intermediate-stop(s) products substitutable for nonstop products.  In addition, the average cross-
price elasticity increases from short-haul distance to mid-haul distance markets, but decreases a 
bit from mid-haul distance to long-haul distance markets.  Consumers in short-haul distance 
markets are less willing to switch to an intermediate-stop(s) product in response to an increase in 
price of a nonstop product.  The results also suggest that intermediate-stop(s) products may be an 
attractive alternative to nonstop products for leisure travelers but less so for business travelers, 
regardless of the length of market distance.                  
We then conduct counterfactual exercises to better understand the extent to which the 
presence of intermediate-stop(s) products influences the pricing of nonstop products.  These 
counterfactual exercises explicitly take into account the two channels through which 
intermediate-stop(s) products may influence the pricing of nonstop products.  The results suggest 
that if we focus solely on the demand-elasticity-driven part of optimal pricing, then we find that 
intermediate-stop(s) products typically has a less than 5% impact, and in most cases less than 
1%, on the price of nonstop products.  However, assuming that the presence of intermediate-
stop(s) products causes the marginal costs of nonstop products to be uniformly lower (about 5%) 
than they would otherwise be, as well as accounting for the demand-elasticity-driven part of 
optimal pricing, results suggest that in many (but far from a majority) markets the current prices 
of nonstop products are lower by at least 5% than they would otherwise owing to the presence of 
intermediate-stop(s) products.  
The focus of our analysis is on domestic air travel markets.  Since consumers may display 
different choice behavior in international air travel markets than they do in domestic markets, 
future research may want to investigate if our findings extend to international air travel markets.     
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Appendix A: A Linear Demand Example Illustrating the Multi-product Firm Effect 
The following example is used to illustrate the multi-product firm effect assuming linear 
demand and constant marginal cost.   
Assume an airline is a multi-product monopolist who offers differentiated products 1 and 
2 in an origin-destination market, where product 1 is a nonstop product while product 2 is an 
intermediate-stop(s) product.  The products’ linear demand equations are: 
𝑞1 = 1 + 𝛽𝑝2 − 𝑝1 ;  𝑞2 = 1 + 𝛽𝑝1 − 𝑝2 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1.  For simplicity, assume each product has the same constant marginal cost, 𝑐.  
The variable profit for the airline is: 
𝜋 = (𝑝1 − 𝑐)[1 + 𝛽𝑝2 − 𝑝1] + (𝑝2 − 𝑐)[1 + 𝛽𝑝1 − 𝑝2] 
The corresponding first-order conditions are: 
𝑐(1 − 𝛽) − 2𝑝1 + 2𝛽𝑝2 + 1 = 0 ;  
𝑐(1 − 𝛽) − 2𝑝2 + 𝛽𝑝1 + 1 = 0.  
Thus, the equilibrium prices for products 1 and 2 are: 
𝑝1
∗ = 𝑝2∗ = 12(1 − 𝛽) + 𝑐2 
Now suppose we counterfactually eliminate the intermediate-stop(s) product, which is 
product 2.  In other words, the airline becomes a single-product monopolist who only offers 
nonstop product 1 in the market.  The product’s linear demand equation is: 
𝑞1 = 1 − 𝑝1. 
With the assumption of constant marginal cost, c, the variable profit is: 
𝜋 = (𝑝1 − 𝑐)[1 − 𝑝1]  
The corresponding first-order condition is: 
𝑐 − 2𝑝1 + 1 = 0   
Thus, the monopoly price is: 
𝑝1
𝑀 = 12 + 𝑐2 
Comparing the price of product 1 before and after the counterfactual exercise, we can see 
that 𝑝1𝑀 <  𝑝1∗, which indicates that the price of product 1 decreases if product 2 is removed.  
Therefore, this example illustrates that, ceteris paribus, there exists a downward pressure on 
price for the remaining products of a multi-product firm when one of the firm’s substitute 
products is removed from the market.      
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Appendix B: Additional Tables  
 
Table B1: Single-equation Estimation of Nested Logit Demand Equations 
with and without Instruments 
    With Instruments Without Instruments 
Variable Coefficient (se)  Coefficient (se) 
Price -12.640* (1.206)  0.358* (0.135) 
Interstop -1.539* (0.052)  -1.059
* (0.032) 
Inconvenience -0.921* (0.088)  -0.950
* (0.060) 
HUB_Origin 1.101* (0.071)  0.864
* (0.032) 
Tour 0.611* (0.048)  -0.592
* (0.036) 
Slot_control -0.392* (0.056)  1.131
* (0.043) 
𝜎 0.039 (0.025)  0.428
* (0.008) 
Constant -6.564* (0.220) 
 
-8.434* (0.115) 
R-square -   0.4662  
N 11425   11425  
* represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Ticketing carrier 
dummy variables are included in the demand model for estimation even though the associated coefficient  
estimates are not reported in the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table B2: Counterfactual Experiment 2A - An Experiment that Assumes the Counterfactual Elimination of 
Intermediate-stop(s) Products Causes Marginal Cost of Nonstop Products to Uniformly Increase by 2.5% 
  No. of Products 
No. of 
Products 
with  
Positive 
% Change 
No. of 
Products 
with  
5 % 
Change 
No. of 
Products 
with  
Negative 
% Change 
No. of Products 
with 
-5%  
Change 
      
Single-product carriers 813 424 26 43 10 
Multi-product carriers 2184 890 107 165 24 
      
Total  2997 1314 133 208 34 
 
Markets  
Nonstop Products Predicted Percent 
Price Change 
No. of Markets that lie within 
the Percent Price Change 
category 
> 0% > 5% < 0% < -5% 
 
No. of 
Markets Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max     
All markets 773 1.0602 2.708 -8.9197 32.655 325 23 45 2 
 
Markets by distance-
haul Categories          
   Short-haul markets 26 0.9924 0.886 -0.7029 2.1205 17 0 2 0 
   Mid-haul markets 499 1.3630 2.766 -5.2107 32.655 259 16 27 1 
   Long-haul markets 248 0.4580 2.620 -8.9197 29.456 49 7 16 1 
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Table B3: Counterfactual Experiment 2B - An Experiment that Assumes the Counterfactual Elimination of 
Intermediate-stop(s) Products Causes Marginal Cost of Nonstop Products to Uniformly Decrease by 2.5% 
  No. of Products 
No. of 
Products 
with  
Positive 
% Change 
No. of 
Products 
with  
5 % 
Change 
No. of 
Products 
with  
Negative 
% Change 
No. of Products 
with 
-5%  
Change 
      
Single-product carriers 813 45 12 404 21 
Multi-product carriers 2184 163 54 813 71 
      
Total  2997 208 66 1217 92 
 
Markets  
Nonstop Products Predicted Percent 
Price Change 
No. of Markets that lie within the 
Percent Price Change category 
> 0% > 5% < 0% < -5% 
 
No. of 
Markets Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max     
All markets 773 -0.5574 2.827 -13.262 43.038 57 9 288 6 
 
Markets by distance-
haul Categories      
    
   Short-haul markets 26 -1.1064 0.937 -2.7162 0.9426 1 0 18 0 
   Mid-haul markets 499 -0.7287 3.316 -13.262 43.038 40 6 232 4 
   Long-haul markets 248 -0.1550 1.568 -9.7856 13.390 16 3 38 2 
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